Abstract: In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies. From a cooperative point of view this leads to two di erent classes of cooperative games. We show that cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative oligopoly games with transferable are totally balanced, but not necessarily convex.
Introduction
In this paper we consider a cooperative approach to oligopoly situations. Hereby we will distinguish two di erent types of oligopolies, namely oligopolies with transferable technologies and oligopolies without transferable technologies. The rst type is characterized by the fact that a group of cooperating rms is allowed to produce according to the cheapest technology present in this group, whereas such a transfer of technologies is not possible for the second type of oligopolies. An illustrative example of the rst type is a collection of potato farmers. Every farmer faces its speci c costs for the production of one ton of potatoes, which strongly depend upon the sowing and irrigation techniques used by the farmer. Cooperating farmers are able to exchange their production techniques, i.e. their knowledge, which is a costless operation. An example of an oligopoly without transferable technologies is a group of shery companies harvesting some species of sh. The costs for the production of one ton of sh is heavily related to the type of ships owned by a rm. In such a situation cooperating rms can not transfer their technologies, since such an operation would imply that some rms have to replace their eet. Another example of an oligopoly without transferable technologies is a group of oil producing countries, each having their own costs for the production of one barrel of oil. For obvious geographical reasons a country like Norway can not produce oil at the same costs as for example Saudi Arabia, even not in case of cooperation.
Usually, oligopoly situations are modeled by means of non-cooperative games. Aumann (1959) introduced two ways of converting a non-cooperative game into a cooperative one. In the rst approach every coalition computes the amount of money which they can guarantee themselves regardless what the players outside the coalition do. The second approach computes for every coalition the minimal amount of money which is such that the players outside the coalition can prevent that the players in the coalition get more. Zhao (1999) showed that for the case of transferable technologies these two approaches lead to the same cooperative game. For special cases of oligopolies, e.g. oligopolies without capacity restrictions, Zhao (1999) provides necessary and su cient conditions for the convexity of these games.
In this paper we focus on the case of oligopolies without transferable technologies. We show that the resulting cooperative game is a convex game in general. Meinhardt (1999) and Driessen and Meinhardt (2000) obtained this result already for the speci c case that all rms are symmetric. Moreover, using the same techniques as in the case of oligopolies without transferable technologies, we are able to show that oligopoly games with transferable technologies are totally balanced in general.
Section 2 contains some preliminaries. In section 3 the cooperative oligopoly games, both with and without transferable technologies, are introduced and a formula for the computation of the coalitional values of these games is provided. Section 4 deals with the properties of cooperative oligopoly games. It is shown that cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technologies are totally balanced.
Preliminaries
We start this section with some notational conventions which will be used throughout this paper. For a 2 IR we de ne a + = maxfa; 0g. If N is a nite (player) set and (X i ) i2N is a collection of non-empty (strategy) spaces then, for every S N, S 6 = ;, the Cartesian product i2S X i is denoted by X S . Moreover, if X i IR for every i 2 N, and x = (x i ) i2S 2 X S for some S N, S 6 = ;, then the sum P i2T x i is denoted by x(T) for every T S. If (c i ) i2S 2 IR S for some S N, S 6 = ;, then c S = min i2S c i .
Consider a monopolistic producer of some good, whose maximum production capacity is y > 0. Suppose that this monopolist faces the linear inverse demand function p(t) = x ? t; t 2 0; y], with x 2 IR. So, if the monopolist produces t units of output, he can sell these at a price of x ? t per unit of output. Note that the monetary scale is chosen in such a way that an increase in output of one unit causes a decrease in price of one unit.
For technical reasons we allow x to be non-positive, although the economical interpretation in this case is meaningless. We assume moreover that the monopolist can produce at zero costs. So, the monopolist faces the following simple maximization problem maximize (x ? t) t such that t 2 0; y]: (1) We will refer to (1) as monopolistic optimization problem (x; y). One easily veri es that the maximum of this problem is f y (x), where the function f y is provided in the de nition below. (i) f y is non-decreasing on IR for every y > 0; (ii) In this paper we also need the following minimax theorem.
Proposition 2 Let X and Z be compact topological spaces and let K : X Z ! IR be a continuous function. Suppose, moreover, that there exists a z 2 Z such that for every x 2 X we have min z2Z K(x; z) = K(x; z ). The second approach results in the game (N; v ) by computing for every coalition S the minimal amount of money which is such that the players outside S can prevent that the players in S get more. In the next subsection we will show that for oligopoly games these two cooperative games coincide, leading to the class of cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies. In subsection 3.2 the approach of Zhao (1999) is followed, where every member in a coalition can produce according to the cheapest technology present in this coalition. Again, in the spirit of Aumann (1959) , two cooperative games are de ned which turn out to coincide. This leads to the class of cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technologies. (4) and (5) (which is equal to the game (N; v nt ) de ned by (6) and (7)), is called the coopera- Let x = (x i ) i2S 2 X S be such that v nt (S) = g S (x ). In order to maximize g S one should use the rms with lowest marginal cost rst. For, if i; j 2 S with i < j are such that x i < y i and x j > 0 then a decrease of x j by some amount " > 0 and an increase of x i by the same amount does not decrease the value of the objective function g S . Hence, we may assume that x is such that x j > 0 for some j 2 S implies x i = y i for every i 2 S with i < j.
Cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies
In order to prove (9) we will distinguish four cases. 
Cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technologies
In this subsection we follow the approach of Zhao (1999) 
The superscript t in (N; v t ) and (N; v t ) is an abbreviation for`transferable'. Once again it can be shown that the games (N; v t ) and (N; v t ) coincide (see also Zhao (1999) ).
Proposition 5 Remark Proposition 6 states that in order to compute the value v t (S) one has to solve a monopolistic optimization problem for every rm in S.
The description of these monopolistic optimization problems is completely analogous to the description of the monopolistic optimization problems in the remark after Proposition 4. The only di erence is that the marginal cost for every rm has to be replaced with the lowest marginal cost in the coalition.
Example 2 
Properties of oligopoly games
In this section we use the results of the previous section in order to prove some properties of cooperative oligopoly games. In subsection 4.1 we show that oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and in subsection 4.2 we show that oligopoly games with transferable technologies are totally balanced.
Properties of oligopoly games without transferable technologies
In order to prove the main result of this section we rst need a lemma.
Lemma 1 
Properties of oligopoly games with transferable technologies
In subsection 4.1 we have seen that every cooperative oligopoly game without transferable technologies is convex. Zhao (1999) De ne the marginal vector y 2 IR N by y i = w(fj 2 N : j ig) ? w(fj 2 N : j i ? 1g) for every i 2 N. By convexity of (N; w) we have y 2 C(w). Moreover, due to (16), we have v t (S) = w(S) for every S N with 1 2 S and v t (S) w(S) for all other S. As a consequence we get x = y 2 C(w) C(v t ):
